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	<title>Address Book — tagged coverage - FogChain</title>
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	<title>Address Book — tagged coverage - FogChain</title>
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		<title>Address Book Hygiene</title>
		<link>https://www.fogment.com/address-book-hygiene/</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 21:22:03 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Wallets]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Address Book]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Address Poisoning]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Crypto Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Crypto Wallets]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Due Diligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Opsec]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Phishing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Self Custody]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Transaction Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Wallet Security]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.fogment.com/address-book-hygiene/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>A crypto address book is a list of saved recipients, and it is one of the few wallet features that quietly decides where your money goes. Every entry is a [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.fogment.com/address-book-hygiene/">Address Book Hygiene</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.fogment.com">FogChain</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A crypto address book is a list of saved recipients, and it is one of the few wallet features that quietly decides where your money goes. Every entry is a shortcut that removes the need to check a string of characters, and shortcuts are exactly where mistakes live.</p>
<p>Good hygiene around a crypto address book is not about neatness. It is about making sure that every saved entry points at an address you verified once, under calm conditions, and that no entry survives a change you did not notice. This guide covers what the list actually stores, how entries drift out of date, and how to audit it in a few minutes a month.</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Saved means unverified.</strong> A stored address is trusted by default on every later send, so the first save is the only moment you really look at it.</li>
<li><strong>Labels are the weak link.</strong> A label that says a name is a claim, not proof, and lookalike labels are how wrong addresses get selected.</li>
<li><strong>Chains are not interchangeable.</strong> An address that works on one network can be meaningless or dangerous on another, especially across EVM chains and newer formats.</li>
<li><strong>Deletion is part of hygiene.</strong> Old entries, test addresses and duplicates create the exact ambiguity an attacker wants.</li>
</ul>
<h2>What a crypto address book holds</h2>
<p>It holds a mapping from a human label to a machine string, sometimes with a network attached. The label is for you; the string is what the network reads. Only one of those has any authority.</p>
<p>That asymmetry explains most address book incidents. People check the label because it is readable, and the label is the part an attacker can influence.</p>
<h3>Labels, networks and notes</h3>
<p>A useful entry carries the address, the network it belongs to, and a note about why it exists, such as which exchange account or which invoice it pays. Without the network field, a withdrawal intended for one chain can be sent on another and arrive nowhere.</p>
<p>Keep labels boring and specific. A label like &#8220;Savings&#8221; tells you nothing about whether the address is yours; &#8220;Savings, hardware wallet, verified 2026-03&#8221; tells you what to check.</p>
<h3>What the list does not verify</h3>
<p>An address book does not confirm that an address belongs to the person you think. It records what you typed or pasted once. If that paste was already wrong, the error is now permanent and pre-approved.</p>
<p>It also does not update. If a counterparty rotates addresses, which some services do per deposit, the saved entry keeps pointing at the old one and funds may still arrive but under a different account, or not at all.</p>
<h2>Why saved addresses go wrong</h2>
<p>Addresses go wrong in three ways: they were wrong on arrival, they were replaced later, or they were never the right kind of address for the network. Each has a different tell.</p>
<h3>Lookalike addresses and clipboard swaps</h3>
<p>Some addresses are generated to share the first and last few characters with a target, which is enough to pass a glance at a truncated display. The middle differs, and the middle is what the network uses. Malware that rewrites the clipboard does the same thing at the moment of pasting.</p>
<p>The defence is mechanical. Never approve a send by comparing only the visible ends. Compare the full string, or use a checksummed display where available, and prefer scanning a code to pasting text.</p>
<h3>Stale entries and changed counterparties</h3>
<p>Services change deposit addresses, teams change treasury wallets, and people change devices. A saved entry from two years ago may still be valid but no longer the address the other side monitors, which turns a correct-looking send into a support ticket.</p>
<p>Re-confirm any address used for a large transfer on a channel you already trust, not on the channel that gave you the address. A message containing an address is not a verification of that address.</p>
<h3>Cross-chain collisions</h3>
<p>The same string can be valid on several networks, and sending on the wrong one is a common and often irreversible mistake. Some formats look identical across chains; others differ by a single prefix character that is easy to miss at small sizes.</p>
<blockquote><p>A saved address is a decision you made once and then stopped thinking about, which is precisely why it deserves an annual review.</p></blockquote>
<h2>Verification methods compared</h2>
<p>Verification methods differ in how much of the string you actually compare, and in how well they survive a hostile clipboard or a hurried tap.</p>
<div class="fog-table not-prose my-6 overflow-x-auto rounded-2xl border border-ink-200/70 bg-surface" data-fog-table><table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>What it checks</th>
<th>Weakness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First and last four characters</td>
<td>Almost nothing; lookalikes are built to pass it</td>
<td>Collisions are cheap to produce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full string, character by character</td>
<td>The entire address</td>
<td>Slow and easy to skim under time pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Checksum-aware display</td>
<td>Format errors and many typos</td>
<td>Does not detect a valid but wrong address</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QR code scanned from the recipient</td>
<td>The exact string they encoded</td>
<td>The code itself can be a sticker over the real one</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test transfer, then confirm receipt</td>
<td>That the address is live and monitored</td>
<td>Costs a fee and two confirmations of waiting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table></div>
<p>The strongest routine combines two rows: scan or paste, then verify the full string against a source you trust, then send a small test amount the first time. No single method covers both a swapped clipboard and an address that was wrong to begin with.</p>
<h2>A monthly clean-up for your crypto address book</h2>
<p>Run this while nothing is pending. Auditing is easier when you are not also trying to send something.</p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Export or screenshot the list.</strong> Reading it outside the send flow removes the temptation to fix things mid-transaction.</li>
<li><strong>Delete test and duplicate entries.</strong> Anything labelled &#8220;test&#8221;, &#8220;temp&#8221; or a near-copy of another label goes first.</li>
<li><strong>Re-verify each remaining entry you still use.</strong> Compare against the source that originally provided it, not against the label.</li>
<li><strong>Add the network to every entry.</strong> If the wallet supports per-network addresses, use them so a wrong-chain send fails at the interface instead of on the network.</li>
<li><strong>Retire counterparties you no longer deal with.</strong> A dormant entry is still selectable in a hurry.</li>
<li><strong>Note the audit date.</strong> A dated list tells you which entries were checked after the last change of device or service.</li>
<li><strong>Keep a small allowlist.</strong> If the wallet supports it, restrict sends to saved entries so a pasted address cannot bypass the list.</li>
</ol>
<p>Expect the list to shrink. Most address books accumulate entries that were used once, and a list of twelve verified entries is safer than a list of sixty that nobody has read since they were added.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.fogment.com/address-book-hygiene/">Address Book Hygiene</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.fogment.com">FogChain</a>.</p>
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